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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article proposes court pluralism as a new theory for analyzing 
the role of the justice system in addressing domestic violence.  It argues 
that a systemic view of the justice system is essential to developing 
coherent reform strategies, and lays out the foundation for taking into 
account the unique functions of civil and criminal justice in domestic 
violence cases.  In doing so, the Article challenges the one-dimensional 
characterization of a fragmented court system as bad for victims of 
domestic violence that dominates legal scholarship, and shows that court 
fragmentation can be an opportunity and potential source of protection 
from systemic problems in the justice system.  This more complete 
understanding of the significance of fragmentation in the justice system is 
especially important given current efforts to merge essential civil and 
criminal court functions within single, integrated domestic violence courts.  
The Article explores claims for integrated courts and argues that the value 
of court pluralism is overlooked. 
Part I introduces the problem of integrated courts in a pluralistic court 
system.  Part II examines the normative function of criminal courts in 
relation to domestic violence cases and contrasts the remedies available to 
victims in criminal and civil courts.  Part III critiques the rationale for 
integrated domestic violence courts from the standpoint of litigation 
strategy, and identifies alternative avenues for system reform.  This Part 
also examines the ways in which integrated courts compromise the 
autonomy-enhancing functions of civil courts. 
Part IV shows that despite the advantages of civil courts for victims, 
the characterization of civil justice as relatively unproblematic is 
inaccurate, and revisits the normative role of the criminal courts.  This Part 
demonstrates that the functionality of criminal courts is compromised by 
persistent process failures in dealing with domestic violence, and shows 
both the synergy between defendants’ rights and victims’ needs, and the 
inadequacy of evaluating domestic violence policies without taking court 
pluralism into account.  This Part argues that, given the risks and lack of 
benefits to victims of integrating criminal and civil court functions, this 
reform strategy should be reconsidered in light of its impact on court 
pluralism. 
Part V, the conclusion, urges reformers to work to identify and 
improve the distinct functionalities of civil and criminal courts for victims 
of domestic violence while maintaining the benefits of court pluralism, and 
identifies priorities for future research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Specialized domestic violence courts that integrate criminal and civil 
functions are often suggested by reformers as a way to improve court-based 
approaches to the problem of domestic violence.1  These reformers argue 
that a fragmented court system, in which a single incident of domestic 
violence can spawn multiple civil and criminal actions, makes it difficult 
for victims to access important legal remedies and leads to conflicting court 
orders, endangering victims and allowing perpetrators to evade 
accountability.2  Specialized, integrated domestic violence courts are 
purported to solve these problems by consolidating, to the greatest extent 
possible, civil and criminal dockets relating to domestic violence, with the 
paradigmatic integrated court assigning all related civil and criminal cases 
to a single judicial officer.3  However, reformers fail to show that 
integrating criminal and civil courts is necessary to solve problems 
identified with multiple forums.  Moreover, recommendations for 
integrated domestic violence courts often ignore the fundamentally 
different purposes and characters of criminal and civil courts. 
Broadly speaking, criminal courts are traditionally concerned with 
 
 1. See, e.g., Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the 
Trouble in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 197 (2008); Lynn A. Combs, Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: The Legacy of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 387, 410-
11 (2006); Hon. Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts: An Efficient 
Approach to Adjudication?, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 981 (2004); Bruce J. Winick, Applying 
the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 40 (2000); 
Hon. Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, The Development of a Specialized Domestic 
Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing Innovative Judicial Paradigms, 69 
UMKC L. REV. 139 (2000) [hereinafter Judicial Paradigms]; Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward 
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic 
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999).  New York state is considered the leader in the integrated 
court movement, with at least  29 integrated court locations as of 2007.  N.Y. STATE DIV. OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERV., NEW YORK STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS FACT SHEET (Jan. 
2, 2007),  available at http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/domviolcrtfactsheet.htm. 
 2. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 23-28.  See also, Leigh Goodmark, Achieving 
Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L. J. 613, 637 (2004-05) 
(asserting that “[l]ack of communication among various systems impedes batterer 
accountability”). 
 3. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 29 (describing integrated domestic violence 
courts as “typically . . . coordinat[ing] civil protection order, family law, and criminal 
dockets so that the court can handle cases, to the greatest extent possible, on a ‘one family, 
one judge’ basis.”); Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability, supra note 2, at 637 
(arguing that domestic violence courts improve batterer accountability by “bringing all of 
the information and services about and for the batterer within the jurisdiction of one judge 
(or set of judges)”). 
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accountability to social norms rather than individual needs.4  As such, they 
serve a powerful educative function that is strengthened by the application 
of consistent policies and procedures.5  The significance of applying these 
principles to domestic violence—a major social problem that was by turns 
condoned or disregarded by the American justice system until the latter part 
of the twentieth century—has been especially profound, although subject to 
controversy and critique from both within and outside the feminist anti-
domestic violence movement.6 
While civil courts may share the norm-setting function of criminal 
courts with respect to domestic violence,7 in contrast to the criminal justice 
system, the civil system is characterized by relative flexibility and 
individual discretion.8  Unlike criminal courts, where state interests 
 
 4. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal the 
Violence of Crime, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 457, 466-67 (2006) (describing criminal justice as an 
affirmative expression of social norms); William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in 
America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL 
PROCESS, 295, 295-96 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel, III eds., 1977) (arguing that the 
criminal justice system exists for the benefit of the community rather than the victim); 
Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 441 (acknowledging 
criminal justice “serves the community's interests in deterring and punishing crime”).  Cf., 
Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social Construction 
of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 815 (2001) (arguing that “the criminal justice 
system responds to harms that seriously damage individuals because those harms cannot be 
satisfied through the system of civil justice, and because there is a popular political outcry 
against officials if they do not respond”). 
 5. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve 
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1333 (1991) (describing criminal proceedings as a 
reaffirmation of moral rules); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1897-98 (1996) 
(discussing the normative effects of state responses to domestic violence); Epstein, supra 
note 1, at 23 (observing that “[a] criminal prosecution culminating in a conviction sends a 
powerful message—to the individual batterer and to the larger community—that the civil 
justice system cannot replicate”).  See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(4) (West 2003) 
(stating that “[t]he Legislature finds and declares that [crimes against a spouse, a person 
with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant's child, 
former spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has 
previously had, a dating or engagement relationship] merit special consideration when 
imposing a sentence so as to display society's condemnation for these crimes of violence 
upon victims with whom a close relationship has been formed”). 
 6. See infra Part II (discussing critiques of a more aggressive criminal justice response 
to domestic violence). 
 7. See, e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order 
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 122 (2005) (observing that civil 
remedies, like criminal prosecutions, bring domestic violence into a public forum and utilize 
state power to “send a message to abusers that domestic violence is unacceptable”).  See 
also, Cheh, supra note 5, at 1404-05 (discussing civil protective orders as a civil-criminal 
hybrid). 
 8. See, e.g., Sarah E. Warne, Rocks, Hard Places, and Unconventional Domestic 
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generally govern, civil courts are accessed voluntarily by victims of 
domestic violence, who determine when and how to present their cases and 
what remedies to seek within the confines of the law.9  On the other hand, 
the individualistic bent of civil court lends itself to less formal legal 
procedures, especially in the family courts where victims will most likely 
seek assistance, and to a de-emphasis of accountability for perpetrators.10 
From the perspective of victims of domestic violence, the 
fundamentally different cultures and functions of the criminal and civil 
courts each carry their own advantages and pitfalls.  Integrating these 
courts into a single, specialized domestic violence court will inevitably 
alter the nature of each.  Integration, then, raises a number of important 
questions, including: Which court features will predominate and to what 
effect?  To the extent each court system offers potential advantages and 
pitfalls, will integrated courts be an improvement, or will the strengths of 
each be compromised or lost?  Moreover, are these risks worth taking? 
In the absence of uniform practices or reliable data on existing 
integrated courts, exploring these questions requires analyzing both the 
ideals and the drawbacks of both systems.11  Recent legal scholarship 
continues a tendency to focus on critiques of the criminal justice system’s 
response to domestic violence,12 failing to ask the crucial question: as 
compared to what?  Problems experienced by victims of domestic violence 
in civil forums have been extensively documented.13  But problems beyond 
 
Violence Victims: Expanding Availability of Civil Orders of Protection in New York, 52 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 284-289 (2007-2008) (contrasting the discretion available to 
domestic violence victims seeking civil protective orders with criminal remedies); Smith, 
supra note 7, at 120 (explaining the choices available to the victim in a civil proceeding).  
Cf., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming 
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1127 (2009) (stating that the decision 
whether or not to petition for a civil protective order is an important act of agency for an 
abuse victim). 
 9. Smith, supra note 7, at 120. 
 10. See infra Part IV (describing the delegalized culture of family courts). 
 11. See Hon. Donald E. Shelton, The Current State of Domestic Violence Courts in the 
United States 3 (Feb. 23, 2007) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=donald_shelton 
(observing there is no central or comprehensive source of information about specialized 
domestic violence courts). 
  The questions raised in this Article may also be challenging to answer empirically, as they 
are aimed at issues of court culture and function rather than case outcomes.  See infra Part V 
(suggesting qualitative methods be employed to study specialized courts). 
 12. For example, on June 25, 2011, a Westlaw search for law review articles discussing 
mandatory arrest policies in domestic violence cases yielded 830 articles. 
 13. See, e.g., WELLESLEY CENTERS FOR WOMEN BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY 
PROJECT, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK  OUT:  A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS  FAMILY COURTS  2 (Nov. 2002) 
(reporting a pattern of human rights abuses against women and children in family courts, 
including discounting evidence of abuse and granting child custody to batterers); ARIZONA 
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those purportedly relating to court fragmentation are rarely acknowledged 
by advocates of integrated courts.14  Other scholars have idealized civil 
forums for the relative autonomy and choice available to victims seeking 
resolution of their legal claims.15  Both perspectives obscure the costs 
victims of domestic violence suffer as a result of the relative informality of 
civil forums such as family court.16  Conversely, proponents of integrated 
courts have not acknowledged the complex ways in which court integration 
compromises the features of civil courts identified as beneficial to 
victims.17  As a result of these deficiencies, current scholarship fails to 
consider whether integrated domestic violence courts may worsen rather 
than improve court-based responses to domestic violence.  This Article is a 
preliminary effort to provide that missing analysis.  More broadly, it seeks 
to build from the uncontroversial notion that civil and criminal courts 
perform distinct functions with regard to domestic violence a new theory of 
court pluralism and a more robust basis from which to engage in court-
based domestic violence policy reform. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the history of the 
criminal justice response to domestic violence and examines the normative 
function of criminal courts in relation to domestic violence cases in greater 
 
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT:  A 
HUMAN  RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 6 (June 2003), 
available at 
http://www.stopfamilyviolence.org/sites/documents/0000/0035/AZ_bmtp_report.pdf 
(reporting that family courts ordered sole or joint custody to perpetrators in up to seventy-
four percent of domestic violence cases surveyed).  See also Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, 
Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the 
Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 662 n.19 & appendix (2003) 
(reporting informal survey findings in 2002 showing that, of a total of thirty-eight appellate 
state court decisions involving custody and domestic violence, thirty-six awarded joint or 
sole custody to alleged or adjudicated batterers).  See also infra Part IV (discussing the ways 
in which victims’ access to civil court remedies for domestic violence is constrained by 
court culture and citing studies). 
 14. For an exception to the rule, see Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: 
Components and Considerations, 2 J. CTR. FOR FAM., CHILD. & COURTS 23, 26-27 (2000) 
(discussing ways in which family courts are guided by principles that may conflict with 
victim safety and batterer accountability).  See also, id. at 29 (discussing the dangers of 
specialized domestic violence courts).  However, Weber fails to consider how combining 
civil and criminal court functions in a domestic violence court might impact either system. 
 15. See, e.g., Warne, supra note 8, at 284 (arguing that the civil system gives victims 
nearly complete control over their cases);  Smith, supra note 7, at 122 (claiming that the 
interests of the state and the victim are better aligned in the civil system).  But see Johnson, 
supra note 8, at 1138-53 (describing ways in which a limited definition of domestic 
violence, embodied in civil protection order statutes, harms victims). 
 16. See infra Part IV (describing a family court culture that fails to adequately protect 
victims of domestic violence and their children). 
 17. See infra Part III (showing how integrated courts threaten to undermine features of 
civil courts that are recognized as autonomy-enhancing for victims of domestic violence). 
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detail.  This Part also sets out the remedies available to victims of domestic 
violence in a pluralistic court system that provides criminal and (often 
multiple) civil forums in which victims may seek relief. 
Part III examines the rationale for integrated domestic violence courts 
based on characterization of the court system as “fragmented” and the 
resulting call to provide victims with “one-stop shopping.”  By analyzing 
the assumptions underlying this rationale, this Part shows that integrating 
courts is unnecessary to effectively address problems purported to follow 
from the existence of multiple courts, and may actually worsen court 
conditions for victims.  Next, this Part shows how civil courts may function 
as an alternative to criminal justice, providing greater choice than do 
criminal courts and enhancing the autonomy of victims of domestic 
violence.  This Part also shows the ways in which integrated courts 
compromise those autonomy-enhancing functions. 
Part IV shows why scholars’ characterization of civil courts as 
relatively unproblematic is inaccurate.  This Part shows that civil courts 
remain a troublesome forum for victims trying to resolve legal problems 
that arise from abusive relationships due to the pervasive lack of 
accountability enjoyed by perpetrators in civil systems.  In this context, the 
importance of the normative role of the criminal courts comes back to the 
fore.  However, as this Part demonstrates, the functionality of criminal 
courts is compromised by a lack of procedural justice for defendants and 
the paradoxical benefits and burdens that are created as a result.  While 
receiving comparatively little attention from legal scholars,18 the persistent 
process failures of criminal courts in dealing with domestic violence show 
both the synergy between defendants’ rights and victims’ needs in the 
context of a pluralistic court system, and the inadequacy of evaluating 
domestic violence policies without taking court pluralism into account. 
Part V concludes that, given the risks and lack of benefits to victims of 
integrating criminal and civil court functions, this reform strategy should be 
abandoned.  This Part urges reformers to work to identify and improve the 
distinct functionalities of civil and criminal justice while maintaining the 
benefits of court pluralism, and sets out an agenda for future research. 
 
 18. As observed by Professor Tamar M. Meekins, in the context of laudable reform 
goals, “few have ventured to comment on the abandonment of the notion of adversarial 
justice” that has tended to accompany the shift to specialized domestic violence criminal 
courts.  Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice:” The Over-Emergence of Specialty 
Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 
(2006). 
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II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REMEDIES IN A PLURALISTIC COURT 
SYSTEM 
A. Criminal Courts and Domestic Violence 
It is difficult to overstate the importance—simultaneously symbolic 
and material—of the criminal justice system’s normative functions in the 
context of domestic violence.  Although a complete history is beyond the 
scope of this Article, a brief overview of the state response is helpful in 
illustrating the criminal justice function. 
As is oft recounted, state responses to domestic violence in the United 
States have evolved from “overt legal approval” of violence against 
married women by their husbands at the country’s founding, to toleration 
by police and courts of such abuse from the mid-nineteenth century until 
the 1970s and the advent of the modern battered women’s movement.19  
Still, conditions for victims seeking help from law enforcement and the 
courts were not much improved as late as 1980, when a report on domestic 
violence by a United States Commission on Human Rights found that 
American police departments and courts still relegated American women 
“to a status as second-class citizens in the eyes of the law.”20 
The latter part of the 1980s and the 1990s saw some improvement in 
 
 19. See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future 
of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1661-74 (recounting the history of 
American domestic violence policy from colonial times to the 1990s).  Legal approval 
derived from the common law doctrine of coverture, under which a woman’s legal identity 
was subsumed within her husband’s upon marriage, and gave rise to the husband’s right to 
physically correct or “chastise” his wife.  See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without 
Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate 
Violence, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 582, 597-98 (1996) (describing the common law principle 
of coverture). For more detailed historical accounts of domestic violence policy in the 
United States, see Linda Gordon, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY 
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988); Elizabeth Pleck, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: 
THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT (1987).  For critiques of historical accounts relying on common law doctrines of 
coverture and the right of chastisement on the one hand, and marital privacy on the other, to 
account for all intimate partner violence, see Goldfarb, supra, at 601-03, and sources cited 
therein (describing why these constructs cannot fully account for intimate partner violence 
in black, and gay and lesbian communities). See also, Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love;” 
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (examining the 
paradoxical consequences of status reform with regard to marital relations and domestic 
violence, including the ways in which the erosion of the right to chastisement reinforced 
both gender and class hierarchies). 
 20. GAIL GEREBENICS ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., UNDER RULE OF THUMB: 
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE i-ii (1982), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/PDFS/ED213812.pdf. 
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the criminal justice response through the advent of more aggressive 
policies, including mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution policies.21  These 
advances remain tentative and incomplete for many reasons, including their 
limited applicability outside the context of heterosexual intimate violence 
involving victims who conform to an elusive ideal.22  Nonetheless, the 
improved enforcement of anti-domestic violence laws is credited with 
removing violence against intimates from the realm of conduct outside the 
purview of the state and recasting it as a social problem and conduct 
subject to state sanction.  To the extent that criminal justice policies against 
domestic violence are actually implemented,23 they send a powerful social 
message that domestic violence is unacceptable24 and help to ensure the 
safety of victims.25  In this context, the adoption of clear, aggressive, and 
consistently applied criminal court processes are viewed as essential to 
providing victims “fair and equal protection under the law.”26 
 
 21. Sack, supra note 19, at 1669-74.  See also Hanna, supra note 5, at 1861-63 
(describing pro-prosecution policies including “hard” and “soft” no-drop prosecution). 
 22. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? 
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 82-92 (2008) (describing the 
paradigmatic female victim of domestic violence as passive, white, and heterosexual) and 
Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 587-89 (describing how construction of domestic violence from 
heterosexual experience renders violence in homosexual relationships unrecognizable). 
 23. Sack, supra note 19, 1697-98 (detailing ongoing problems of under-enforcement of 
domestic violence laws, including low proportions of domestic violence arrests and high 
proportions of arrests that are not prosecuted, even in cities with mandatory arrest and no-
drop prosecution policies). 
 24. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 5, at 1897; Epstein, supra note 1.  See also, CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 243(e)(4) (West 2008). 
 25. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 5, at 1893-94 (describing a more than twenty-three 
percent decrease in domestic violence homicides in San Diego following the inception of an 
aggressive prosecutorial strategy in that city in 1984 through 1994, along with decreased re-
arrest and re-prosecution rates).  See also Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, 
Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 30 (2000) 
(stating that “[w]ithout legal intervention, many non-fatal [domestic violence] incidents 
escalate into more serious incidents”); Epstein, supra note 1, at 23 (noting that in some 
cases incarceration of the perpetrator may be the only way to ensure the victim’s safety).  
Criminal justice interventions may also protect “collateral” victims of the violence, 
including children, and disrupt the destructive intergenerational impacts of domestic 
violence.  See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 37-42 
(2002) (describing the effects on children of exposure to domestic violence).  In addition, 
like prosecution of other violent crimes, aggressive prosecution of domestic violence may 
protect other, future victims of the same or other crimes committed by the perpetrator.  See 
id. at 19 (explaining that batterers tend to abuse multiple partners); Judicial Paradigms, 
supra note 1, at 139 n.2 (pointing out that perpetrators of domestic violence are not 
necessarily specialists but include criminals with long records of prior offenses). 
 26. Hanna, supra note 5, at 1898. 
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i. Remedies Available in Criminal Courts 
In addition to the imposition of a sentence including jail or prison 
time,27 criminal courts may order a defendant convicted of a domestic 
violence crime to attend a batterer treatment program, obtain treatment for 
drug or alcohol dependency, and pay restitution to the victim.28  Additional 
remedies pending trial, and/or as a condition of sentence or probation, 
include orders prohibiting the defendant from engaging in further acts of 
violence and harassment against the victim and other specified persons, 
requiring the defendant to surrender firearms, excluding the defendant from 
the family residence, and limiting the defendant’s contact with protected 
parties.29  Ten states and the District of Columbia also permit inclusion of 
pets on protective orders.30 
ii. Benefits and Drawbacks for Victims 
As noted earlier, there are broad social benefits from the criminal 
justice system’s normative and educative functions.  In addition, the 
specific remedies listed above benefit individual victims by, for example, 
providing for physical separation from the perpetrator through 
 
 27. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 243(e) & 273.5 (West 2008) (describing time in 
county jail (up to one year) and state prison (two to four years) that may be imposed upon 
conviction for domestic violence crimes). 
 28. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097 (West 2009) (mandating successful 
completion of batterer treatment for individuals convicted of domestic violence offences, 
and authorizing orders for treatment of chemical dependency, and for restitution, as 
conditions of probation in domestic violence cases).  More controversially, some courts 
order defendants charged with domestic violence crimes to attend batterer treatment pending 
trial.  See ROBERT V. WOLF ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, PLANNING A DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE COURT: THE NEW YORK STATE EXPERIENCE 8-11 (2004), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/dvplanningdiary.pdf (discussing the 
court’s use of batterer intervention programs as a condition of bail in order to facilitate 
judicial monitoring of alleged batterers). 
 29. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1999) (authorizing issuance of a criminal 
protective order in a pending domestic violence case) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097 
(West 2009) (authorizing issuance of criminal protective order).  See also California Judicial 
Counsel Form CR-160 Criminal Protective Order—Domestic Violence (rev. Jan. 1, 2009) 
(incorporating statutory provisions). 
 30. Phil Arkow & Tracy Coppoloa, Expanding Protective Orders to Include 
Companion Animals, AM. HUMANE, 
http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/interaction/hab-link-ppo-companion-
animals.pdf  (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (compiling legislation).  States currently permitting 
protection of pets are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, 
Tennessee, and Vermont.  Id. at 2. For information on the relationship between domestic 
violence and animal abuse, see Frank R. Ascione et al., Battered Pets and Domestic 
Violence: Animal Abuse Reported by Women Experiencing Intimate Violence and by 
Nonabused Women, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 354 (2007). 
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incarceration or stay-away orders, and by requiring a defendant to obtain 
treatment. Moreover, in contrast to the civil system, these remedies are 
sought and obtained by the state using state resources.  Victims who cannot 
afford an attorney to assist them in a civil court action may especially 
benefit from access to free, summary, and effective processes of criminal 
law.31 
The role of the state in criminal prosecution may also benefit victims 
in other, more complex ways.  The fact that decisions about whether to 
prosecute are made independently of the victim’s wishes in some 
jurisdictions is a benefit to victims who are pressured to “drop” charges by 
perpetrators and family members regardless of their desire for the case to 
proceed.32  Some victims who are otherwise ready and willing to see the 
perpetrator arrested and prosecuted may benefit from the state taking 
responsibility for those decisions for other reasons. For example, taking 
direct action that may lead to incarceration of another person with whom 
one shares a connection that may include love, children, and/or other 
family and community ties, might be perceived by the victim as a betrayal 
of personal or group values.33  For members of minority communities who 
 
 31. For an early argument to this effect from a Progressive-era reformer, see Reginald 
Heber Smith, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE 
POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (1919) (arguing 
criminalization of family-related crimes improved the position of women before the law by 
eliminating barriers to justice present in civil court such as costs and delay).  See also Judith 
Wittner, Reconceptualizing Agency in Domestic Violence Court, in COMMUNITY ACTIVISM 
AND FEMINIST POLITICS: ORGANIZING ACROSS RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER 81, 87 (Nancy A. 
Naples ed., 1998) (reporting that women using domestic violence court are mostly without 
resources and have no choice but to rely on public agencies for assistance in escaping 
violent relationships).  The speed as well as the nature of relief available in the criminal 
courts may, however, vary by jurisdiction.  Compare Epstein, supra note 1, at 24 n.114 
(noting delays in prosecution of domestic violence offences in the District of Columbia of 
up to six months) with WOLF ET AL., supra note 28, at 5-6 (identifying procedures for swift 
judicial action in domestic violence cases as a key court component). 
 32. Of course, victims may be pressured to oppose prosecution regardless of 
prosecutorial policies.  For example, clients whom I have represented in domestic violence 
cases have reported overt pressure from relatives to “drop” criminal charges against the 
perpetrator, including daily phone calls and emails, threats of retaliation, and, in one 
instance, provision of a written script of what to say to the prosecutor in order to convince 
him to drop the case, despite prosecutorial policies that did not formally take victim wishes 
into account.  See also Keith Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience 
of Presumptive Arrest and Prosecution, 42 LAW & SOC’Y Rev. 111, 124-26 (2008) 
(describing the efforts of domestic violence criminal defendants subject to presumptive 
prosecution to influence their abused partners in order to gain more control over their case).  
However, such policies do shield the victim from direct responsibility for the decision to 
prosecute. 
 33. In a recent case, a client called me to report her husband’s location so that he could 
be arrested for outstanding bench warrants related to criminal domestic violence charges.  
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experience mistreatment by criminal justice authorities, or who are subject 
to deportation, the feeling of betrayal may be particularly great.34  
Mandatory arrest and prosecution policies can shield victims from direct 
responsibility for decisions to arrest and to prosecute by camouflaging, but 
not requiring, victim cooperation. 
Despite these benefits to victims, the criminal justice response to 
domestic violence has been the target of intense criticism.  Numerous legal 
scholars argue that the criminal justice process is overly focused on the 
perpetrator—both in terms of its emphasis on punishment and on 
procedures designed to protect defendants’ constitutional rights—at the 
expense of victims’ immediate concerns about safety and economic 
survival, perpetrator rehabilitation, and family (re)unification.35  In this 
context, policies that deny victims control over the decision whether to 
arrest or prosecute domestic violence criminal offences have been 
 
When I asked her why she had not called the police herself, she responded that she was not 
comfortable “making that call,” and preferred that I call the police instead. 
 34. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance, and Hope in 
LatCrit Theory and Praxis: Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, 
and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048 (2000) (observing that the 
risk of an undocumented partner being deported, as well as a fear of being deported herself 
if she is undocumented, may lead a victim to fear calling the police for help); Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (asserting a general unwillingness of 
people of color to subject their private lives to intrusion by a frequently hostile state).  See 
also, Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Reading between the Lines is Not Enough: Lessons 
From Media Coverage of a Domestic Violence Homicide-Suicide, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL'Y & L. 269, 286-88 (2009) (discussing the ways in which post-colonial Indian 
nationalism interacts with the immigration experiences of Asian Indians in the United 
States, such  that revealing domestic abuse is perceived as a betrayal of culture by Asian 
Indian victims and their communities).  But see Leslye E. Orloff  et al., Recent 
Development: Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and Police 
Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 67-70 (2003) (reporting survey findings suggesting 
that while the victim’s immigration status is a significant factor in predicting likelihood of 
calling for police assistance with domestic violence, the perpetrator’s status was not 
significant); Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” 
Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 438-41 (2003) (discussing mixed findings in studies 
regarding victim calls to 911 and the limitations of current approaches to researching the 
problem). 
 35. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of 
State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 610 (1999) (critiquing the use of mandatory 
intervention in domestic violence as potentially jeopardizing the victim’s long-term safety 
and ability to heal).  Cf. Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution 
Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 471 (2003) (acknowledging that 
aggressive prosecution is flawed, but at the present time is the most effective way to deal 
with domestic violence). 
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characterized as undermining victim safety and autonomy.36  Related 
prosecution strategies for trying domestic violence cases without victim 
participation (“victimless prosecution”) have also been criticized for further 
eliminating victims’ voices from the courtroom.37  Many scholars also note 
the differential impact of these issues on the poor and communities of 
color, who are more likely to be subject to criminal justice procedures.38  
These scholars argue that the victim’s opinion about which steps to take 
should be incorporated into the criminal justice decision-making process 
for material, as well as therapeutic reasons.39 
In this context, civil courts emerge from critiques of criminal justice 
as advantageous due to the comparative as well as complimentary benefits 
that civil remedies and procedures can provide for victims.  The likelihood 
that victims will need to access this system in addition to, or instead of, 
criminal justice fuels arguments for integrated courts. 
B. Civil Courts in Contrast to Criminal Courts 
Remedies available in civil courts may supplement criminal justice in 
ways that may be both additive and complementary.40  In addition to stay-
away orders, conduct orders, and criminal protective orders for batterer 
treatment, civil protective orders typically allow for detailed orders 
regarding custody and visitation of children.41  Civil protective orders may 
 
 36. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 35, at 554-55. 
 37. See Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the 
Sound of Silence, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV 1, 33-43 (describing negative consequences of 
eliminating victim participation in domestic violence prosecutions). 
 38. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 34, at 1042-49 (discussing risks of pro-arrest policies 
for poor Latina victims of domestic violence, including risk of arrest, police abuse, 
increased state intervention into personal life, and deportation); Jennifer C. Nash, From 
Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory, 11 CARDOZO 
WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 323-24 (2005) (discussing the ways in which even seemingly neutral 
criminal justice procedures, and their impacts on minority communities, cannot be 
understood outside the context of racism).  See generally, DAG MACLEOD ET AL., CAL. 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA: AN 
EVALUATION 54-55 (2009), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/batterer-
report.pdf (finding that men sentenced to batterer intervention programs in California have 
disproportionately low levels of educational attainment, and are disproportionately poor and 
Hispanic). 
 39. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 34, at 1020 (arguing that with adequate resources, 
women can decide a course of action that better meets their needs).  Some scholars also 
critique criminal justice strategies on more philosophical grounds.  See, e.g., Aya Gruber, 
The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 823-24 (2007) (arguing that 
criminalization and conservatization of the domestic violence movement has reinforced 
society’s patriarchal attitude towards women). 
 40. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1342-43 (discussing civil injunctive relief, including in 
domestic violence cases, as a supplement and alternative to criminal justice). 
 41. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered 
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also provide additional economic relief beyond restitution, including child 
and spousal support and payment of household or other bills.  Civil courts 
can also address broader legal issues of the relationship, including 
dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership, division of property, and 
parentage of children.  There may also be actions in tort for damages 
connected to the abuse available in civil, but not criminal, courts.42 
Some forms of temporary relief may also be available more quickly in 
civil court.  Temporary orders of protection often may be obtained on the 
same day an application is made, and in some cases may be issued without 
notice to the restrained party.43  Orders available after notice and a hearing 
usually require only several weeks’ notice, and orders shortening time for 
notice may be available if adequate supporting facts can be alleged.44 
The distinctions between the relief available in civil, as opposed to 
criminal, forums can be overstated.  For example, although criminal courts 
do not normally adjudicate child custody and visitation, a criminal court 
can protect child witnesses and victims by including them as protected 
persons in criminal protective orders.45  When bench officers in criminal 
courts defer to family courts and fail to exercise their discretion to make 
these orders, they arguably thwart what is for victims a key advantage of 
the criminal justice system, throwing state responsibility for protecting the 
public back onto the victim.  This is, however, a matter of practice and not 
a result of a limitation on the court’s authority to act. 
Differences in the timeliness of relief available can also be overstated.  
For example, although limited relief may be available in civil court on an 
 
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910-1006 
(1993) (describing remedies available under civil protective orders in various states).  In 
some states civil protective orders may remain in effect longer than criminal orders, as well.  
For example, civil protective orders issued under California’s Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act can be renewed permanently upon request after an initial term of up to five 
years.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).  See also Klein & Orloff, 
supra, at 1085-88 (describing duration of various states’ civil protective orders, from a 
period of one year to an indefinite duration). 
 42. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(a) (West 2009) (providing that an individual can 
be liable for domestic violence in tort once specific elements are satisfied).  See also Julie 
Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 
29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 505, 507 (1995) (observing that civil remedies for torts involving 
gender-based violence are available in several states and the District of Columbia). 
 43. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 41, at 1031-42; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 240-246 (West 
2004). 
 44. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 242 (West 2004) (providing that a temporary protective 
order shall be made returnable in no more than twenty five days); CAL. FAM. CODE § 243(f) 
(West 2004) (providing that the Court, on either the applicant’s motion or its own motion, 
can shorten the time for notice). 
 45. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1999) (authorizing criminal courts to 
make orders for the protection of victims and witnesses of crime, and the children of victims 
and witnesses). 
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expedited basis pursuant to an ex parte application for an order of 
protection, a pending criminal case arising from the same facts may delay a 
full hearing on the civil matter until the criminal matter concludes—
effectively mooting the timeliness distinction for orders relating to 
economic issues, including child and spousal support and bill payment.46  
In addition, the availability of orders for economic relief is relevant only to 
that subset of victims whose spouse or co-parent has funds obtainable 
through such orders. 
Nonetheless, civil remedies are obviously different in character and 
type than criminal remedies. Victims subject to criminal abuse may in fact 
need to access the civil system instead of, or in addition to, the criminal 
system for economic or other legal issues arising from and collateral to an 
abusive relationship.  Moreover, civil remedies not only complement 
criminal remedies, they may also provide a forum for redress of abuse that 
does not rise to the level of a cognizable crime, including non-physical 
abuse such as emotional and economic abuse.47  In addition, the lower 
burden of proof in civil actions may allow redress for criminal abuse that a 
prosecutor determines cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.48 
As advocates of integrated courts point out, victims of domestic 
violence may therefore find themselves in multiple courts dealing with 
legal problems arising from the same set of facts—a situation that may be 
complicated by the multiplicity of civil forums adjudicating family law 
matters in some jurisdictions.49  The difficulties that arise from this 
situation are the basis for arguments for integrated courts as a way to 
 
 46. In my experience litigating domestic violence-related matters in civil court, judicial 
officers are very reluctant to go forward with a civil case while a criminal case is pending 
due to concern for the criminal defendant’s right to avoid self-incrimination.  But see Jane 
H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34 FAM. 
L.Q. 43, 54-55 (2000) (reporting that some states limit the number of continuances 
permitted in civil protection hearings, and at least one state provides that the civil case 
cannot be used as evidence in the criminal case in an effort to address this problem). 
 47. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1406 (observing that civil protection orders can prohibit 
non-criminal conduct even though such orders may be enforceable with criminal penalties).  
But see Johnson, supra note 8, at 1138 (explaining that only one-third of states provide a 
civil remedy for abuse absent a threat of physical violence). 
 48. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1405 (describing the importance of civil protective 
orders in cases where prosecution is impractical or unlikely); Smith, supra note 7, at 119 
(observing that the lower standard of proof required for civil protection orders permits 
victims who lack sufficient evidence to support a criminal order the ability to obtain 
redress). 
 49. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining that a victim typically has to 
manage both civil and criminal cases located in different courtrooms or courthouses); 
Barbara A. Babb, Where We Stand: An Analysis of America’s Family Law Adjudicatory 
Systems and the Mandate to Establish Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L. Q. 31, 47 (1999) 
(critiquing the traditional legal system’s effect on family law matters, due in part to its sub-
categorization of cases within civil and criminal courts). 
MACDOWELL_Typeset.doc 8/30/2011  12:39 PM 
110 Texas Journal of Women and the Law Vol. 20:2 
 
provide victims with “one-stop shopping.” 
III. MISDIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM: COURT FRAGMENTATION 
AND INTEGRATED COURTS 
A. Fragmented Courts and Access to Justice 
Proponents of integrated courts argue that the fragmented nature of the 
traditional court system makes it difficult for victims to obtain the 
complementary relief that may be available to them in civil and criminal 
courts.50  As described by Deborah Epstein, a victim with a pending 
criminal case may also need a civil protective order, and to file for divorce, 
child custody, and child and/or spousal support.51  Many victims will 
receive incomplete or inaccurate information about available relief.52  For 
those who learn about the availability of multiple court-based solutions, 
more barriers await.  In some jurisdictions: 
To initiate each case the victim must master an unfamiliar set of 
court procedures and wait in line for hours.  Each case must be 
filed in a separate clerk’s office and, in many jurisdictions, a 
different courthouse in another part of town.  If she is employed, 
or has difficulty obtaining child care, she often cannot spare the 
hours and sometimes days it takes to get into several court 
systems, let alone pursue multiple cases through to trial.  For a 
person in crisis, who may be recovering from a beating the night 
before, these obstacles can prove insurmountable.53 
Moreover, a lack of case coordination within any given court system 
can result in the involvement of multiple judicial officers in even a single 
case.  Because courts typically do not share information about related 
cases,54 a proliferation of cases and decision-makers increases the 
likelihood of under-informed decisions and conflicting orders.55  Resulting 
 
 50. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 23 (characterizing the traditional court system as 
one that deprives victims of “the comprehensive protection they need and the relief to which 
they are legally entitled”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 25-26. 
 53. Id. at 25. 
 54. See id. at 27 (observing that the traditional adversarial system leaves an 
“information vacuum” around the fact finder). 
 55. But see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3031 (West 2004) (encouraging courts considering 
child custody or visitation to make “a reasonable effort to ascertain” if any protective orders 
are in effect concerning the parties or minors and not to make any order inconsistent 
therewith); S.F., CAL., UNIF. LOCAL R. CT. 19, available at  
http://sfsuperiorcourt.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2638 (setting forth 
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ambiguities may compromise victims’ safety, advantage perpetrators, and 
ultimately “preclude domestic violence victims from obtaining 
comprehensive justice.”56 
Reformers envision integrated civil and criminal domestic violence 
courts as a way to resolve the problems associated with a fragmented court 
system by concentrating court services within a single court.  Upon close 
examination, however, separate civil and criminal courts are not the source 
of these problems, nor is the integration of civil and criminal courts their 
solution. 
i. The Conflicting Orders Problem 
Integrated courts that coordinate or combine related cases would seem 
to reduce the problem of conflicting orders, along with the associated 
potential for dangerous ambiguities and gamesmanship by perpetrators of 
domestic violence.  But in order to ascertain whether integrated courts are a 
reasonable solution, it is important to distinguish between conflicts that 
occur solely within either the civil or criminal court systems and conflicts 
that occur between systems, and to analyze these problems separately.  This 
is where the relationship of the problem to the purported solution breaks 
down. 
First, to the extent that conflicting orders emanate from defects within 
civil or criminal court systems that are unrelated (or not specific) to 
adjudication of domestic violence, the problem obviously impacts more 
than just those cases identified as involving domestic violence.  Moreover, 
the American Bar Association reports that domestic violence issues 
implicate not just family and criminal law, but arise in almost every area of 
law, including corporate, bankruptcy, tort, and real property law.57  
Therefore, it would be more logical to address the problem systemically 
within the civil and criminal courts, rather than programmatically through 
the creation of a specialized, integrated court handling only domestic 
violence cases. 
Proponents of integrated courts acknowledge the broader nature of the 
conflicting orders problem, but argue that the problem is greater for 
domestic violence cases because victims of domestic violence tend to have 
 
protocols for communication between criminal and family courts regarding domestic 
violence and child custody cases). 
 56. Epstein, supra note 1, at 28. 
 57. Deborah Goelman & Roberta Valente, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW SCHOOL 
REPORT I-5 (1997). See generally Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Do You Need to Know About 
Domestic Violence? How Attorneys Can Recognize and Address the Problem, 53 LA. B.J. 20 
(2005) (describing the effect of domestic violence on different types of legal practice). 
MACDOWELL_Typeset.doc 8/30/2011  12:39 PM 
112 Texas Journal of Women and the Law Vol. 20:2 
 
multiple cases arising from the same facts.58  However, the diversity of 
actions associated with domestic violence suggests an argument for a 
systemic solution, not a fix for only those cases identified as domestic 
violence cases.  Systemic court reforms, such as improved case assignment 
and management and stable judicial assignments, would better resolve this 
problem for all litigants, any number of whom may be litigating cases 
impacted by domestic violence, than would creating specialized, integrated 
courts. 
Second, to the extent that conflicts arise from the relationship between 
orders made in separate civil and criminal domestic violence proceedings, 
the problem is more easily resolved by rules governing the priority of court 
orders than by integrating the courts.  For example, California has resolved 
this problem by providing that protective orders issued by criminal courts 
take precedence over all other court orders except more restrictive 
emergency protective orders.59  As to the likelihood that other types of 
cases might spawn conflicting civil and criminal court orders,60 a more 
comprehensive priority rule may be in order.  However, integrated 
domestic violence courts are simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient 
to solve the problem of conflicting orders. 
Third, integrated courts create a new problem for victims: the “all 
your eggs in one basket” problem.  This problem results because 
assignment to a single judicial officer only helps the limited number of 
victims with multiple cases whose first case proceeds favorably and where 
the hearing officer is provided with complete information.  This problem is 
worth examining closely. 
A victim with both a criminal and a civil domestic violence case will 
likely proceed with only one case at a time, with the criminal case litigated 
first.61  There are at least three possible outcomes in the criminal case if the 
prosecutor goes forward: the case may settle with a plea of guilty or no 
contest to some portion of the charges, it may proceed to trial and result in 
a conviction (although not necessarily on the most serious charge), or it 
may proceed to trial and not result in a conviction (either though a finding 
 
 58. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that the unique characteristics of 
domestic violence cases make them more likely to result in conflicting orders than other 
types of cases). 
 59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2(e)(2) (West 1999).  Emergency protective orders are 
issued only upon the request of a law enforcement officer stating a reasonable belief that the 
party is in imminent danger, and may last no longer than seven days from issuance.  See 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.91 (West 2010). 
 60. For example, witnesses in the prosecution of a white-collar crime might be subject 
to protective orders that conflict with orders regarding the management of property. 
 61. See supra note 46.  If the civil case proceeds first, due process concerns raise a 
separate set of problems from those considered here.  See infra Part IV (discussing the 
ramifications of process defects in criminal courts). 
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of not guilty or a mistrial).  Of these potential outcomes, a plea of guilty or 
no contest or a guilty verdict on domestic violence charges may help the 
victim in the subsequent civil case.62  However, even with a favorable 
result, the victim will probably need to present additional evidence about 
the abuse relevant to the civil proceeding, and will definitely want to do so 
if the criminal case was resolved with a plea prior to the criminal trial.  
Therefore, the supposed litigation advantage to the victim related to a 
single hearing officer is limited. 
Moreover, it may be more difficult to convince an officer who 
oversaw the criminal matter to permit time for a full evidentiary hearing on 
abuse as it relates to civil issues, such as child custody, than it would be to 
obtain such a hearing in a different forum with a hearing officer who 
cannot claim familiarity with the salient facts.  In addition, the victim may 
believe the officer is predisposed toward the defendant regardless of the 
outcome of the first case, or even because of it.63  In each of these 
instances, the availability of another forum for the civil matter would be a 
boon rather than a detriment to the victim. 
ii. The Under-Informed Victim Problem 
Proponents of integrated domestic violence courts also seek to 
improve victims’ access to information about available legal and extra-
legal remedies and services.64  Integrated courts are purported to facilitate 
 
 62. For example, twenty-five states have statutory presumptions that an adjudicated 
perpetrator of domestic violence shall not be awarded custody of minor children.  See NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT A 
PERPETRATOR OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHALL NOT HAVE SOLE CUSTODY, JOINT LEGAL 
CUSTODY, OR JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY (Jan. 1, 2009) (compiling state statutes) (on file with 
author).  A prior finding of domestic violence in criminal court may also be relevant to the 
division of marital property in a subsequent action for dissolution of marriage.  See Edward 
S. Snyder & Laura W. Morgan, Domestic Violence Ten Years Later, 19 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL L. 33, 52-54 (2004) (discussing the approaches to considering domestic 
abuse as a factor in property division at divorce).  Some states also consider a history of 
domestic violence in connection with the award of spousal support.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 4325(a) (West 2004) (establishing a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of 
proof against an award of temporary or permanent spousal support to a spouse convicted of 
an act of domestic violence against the other spouse within the five-year period before 
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter). 
 63. Most experienced litigators have observed the tendency of judges to give the losing 
party on one issue some favor on subsequent issues.  See also Meier, supra note 13, at 675 
(describing the belief of judges in domestic violence cases that it is unfair to consider the 
perpetrator’s violence against the other parent when addressing child custody issues). 
 64. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 1, at 39 (explaining that domestic violence courts can 
offer a range of services to victims facilitated by the use of judicial referrals); Judicial 
Paradigms, supra note 1, at 144 (supporting the implementation of a specialized domestic 
violence court that is “victim-centered in terms of providing concrete court and community 
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this goal by concentrating domestic violence cases within a single forum.65  
However, this solution relies on the supposition that domestic violence 
cases typically enter the court system in a uniform manner (e.g., in the 
immediate aftermath of a domestic violence incident when the victim is in 
crisis), pre-packaged as domestic violence cases, or can otherwise be 
discerned by the court.  To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that 
many cases involving domestic violence are never identified by courts as 
domestic violence cases, even when the violence is relevant to the issues 
before the court.66  Moreover, intake processes established specifically to 
identify the existence of domestic violence have been unsuccessful.67  
Thus, it is highly likely that there will be numerous domestic violence cases 
that do not get captured by any specialized domestic violence court and that 
end up being litigated in other courts instead.68 
The proliferation of specialized domestic violence courts may also 
have the unintended and paradoxical effect of marginalizing both those 
domestic violence cases within, and outside of, the specialized court 
system.  Domestic violence cases already tend to be disfavored by judges 
and considered less important than other cases.69  Segregating them from 
other legal claims may reinforce rather than mitigate these attitudes, 
 
services and resources to victims and their children”); Tsai, supra note 1, at 1317-18 
(claiming integrated courts improve victims’ access to services). 
 65. See, e.g., Tsai, supra note 1, at 1322 (arguing that advocates will have improved 
access to victims in a single, integrated court).  See also Shaffer, supra note 1, at 993 
(noting that integrated courts will also increase efficiency through the coordination of 
service providers, court personnel, judges and others from the community). 
 66. See, e.g., Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody 
Determinations Among Couples With a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1013 (2005), available at 
http://vaw.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/11/8/991 (reporting that almost one-half of 
marital dissolution cases surveyed that involved a substantiated history of male-perpetrated 
domestic violence contained no mention of domestic violence in the case file; the remaining 
case files contained allegations of domestic violence with no substantiation, despite the 
existence of such evidence); Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation in Cases of 
Domestic Violence: Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 1022, 1046 (2005), available at http://vaw.sagepub.com/content/11/8/1022 
(reporting evidence that family court mediators in child custody cases “often failed to 
recognize and report [domestic violence to the bench officer] even when there were clear 
indicators of [domestic violence].”). 
 67. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 66 (reporting that court forms used by family 
court mediators in child custody cases to report the existence of domestic violence to bench 
officers “very often failed in signaling the existence of abuse”). 
 68. It is also important to note that a non-disclosure of domestic violence to court 
personnel may be the result of a victim’s reasoned decision to withhold information.  See 
infra Part IV (discussing why a victim may choose not to disclose a history of domestic 
violence in the context of a family law case). 
 69. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between 
“The Truly National and the Truly Local” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2001). 
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resulting in the further stigmatization of domestic violence claims and 
reducing the likelihood that they will be taken seriously in any court.70 
In addition, the existence of specialized courts may discourage non-
specialized judicial officers and other court personnel from educating 
themselves about domestic violence or seeing the potential relevance of 
domestic violence to the cases before them.71  Similarly, the concentration 
of information and services in specialized courts makes it less likely that 
such benefits will be available to litigants throughout the court system.  As 
a result, the significant numbers of victims of domestic violence who are 
likely to be litigating in the general court population at any given time may 
be not only under-informed, but also isolated and unrecognized by a court 
system that is hostile to their domestic violence claims should they arise. 
Although the potential to further marginalize domestic violence cases 
is a problem common to all specialized domestic violence courts, its effects 
may logically be heightened by efforts to relegate both civil and criminal 
domestic violence cases to a single, integrated court.  Integrated courts also 
threaten to erode the benefits to victims of a pluralistic court system, even 
as proponents seek to facilitate victims’ access to justice.  In particular, 
integrated courts pose an increased risk to autonomy-enhancing aspects of 
civil systems that have been identified as particularly valuable to victims of 
domestic violence. 
B. Civil Courts and Victim Autonomy 
As reflected in the critiques of criminal justice responses to domestic 
violence discussed in Part II, victims who have grounds to proceed in either 
civil or criminal forums may choose to proceed in civil court for many 
reasons, including concerns about the impact of criminal processes on 
physical safety, economic, social, and immigration status, and personal 
autonomy.  In regard to the latter, scholars note that civil remedies are not 
simply different in type or character than criminal remedies, but differ in 
the level of choice by which they are accessed and pursued within the 
system.72 
For example, in contrast to the control exercised by law enforcement 
and prosecutors over entry to the criminal court system, the decision to 
initiate an order of protection in civil court “lies solely with the victim.”73  
 
 70. Id. at 1129. 
 71. Id. at 1113-14; Goelman & Valente, supra note 57; Weissman, supra note 69, at 
1128-29. 
 72. Warne, supra note 8, at 288-89; Smith, supra note 7, at 122; Laurie S. Kohn, 
What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New 
Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 553 (2010). 
 73. Warne, supra note 8, at 284. 
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The victim also selects the remedies that are appropriate for the victim’s 
individual situation.74  Similarly, decisions to proceed to trial, seek 
settlement, or withdraw a petition lie with the victim, subject only in some 
circumstances to court approval.75  Moreover, if the abuser violates a civil 
protective order obtained by the victim, the victim may have the choice of 
enforcing the order in civil or criminal court, or both.76 
Scholars suggest that the degree of choice given to the victim about 
timing and strategy make civil remedies more effective than identical 
criminal remedies.77  This view assumes that victims have superior 
knowledge and ability to discern what steps are necessary to ensure their 
safety.  In addition, civil remedies may “work” because they “giv[e] the 
victim a sense of control over her life”78 and empower the victim to make 
additional, positive life changes.79  Control over the court process is also 
associated with additional benefits to victims, such as a greater sense of 
security and wellbeing.80  In this context, scholars characterize choice as a 
value available to victims in civil, as opposed to criminal, courts. 
Integrated domestic violence courts arguably impinge on the level of 
choice that would otherwise be available to victims through separate civil 
courts.  This is due in part to the paradoxical nature of administrative 
responses to domestic violence.  As described by Deborah Weissman, the 
earnest desire to improve system responses to domestic violence is not the 
only reason for the development of specialized domestic violence courts.81  
These courts also result from administrative efforts to deal with an influx of 
domestic violence cases following the expansion of legal remedies and 
public education about domestic violence.82  Further, the administrative 
response is associated with increased bureaucratization and routinization in 
the handling of domestic violence and other family-related cases, including 
the proliferation of standardized forms and reliance on lay advocates to 
assist unrepresented litigants.83  While arising from efforts to increase 
 
 74. Smith, supra note 7, at 120. 
 75. Warne, supra note 8, at 286-87. 
 76. Id. at 289-90. 
 77. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7, at 95 n.15 (opining that civil protective orders may be 
more effective than criminal protective orders “because the victim, not the government, is 
the petitioner”). 
 78. Id. at 95. 
 79. See Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, New Approaches to Poverty Law, Teaching, and 
Practice: Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 347 n.25 (1995) (observing that “[s]uccess stories of this kind do not 
appear in the press because the absence of violence is not considered a newsworthy event”). 
 80. See Smith, supra note 7, at 117 n.155, 121 n.176 (citing studies). 
 81. Weissman, supra note 69, at 1128. 
 82. Weissman, supra note 69, at 1126-28.  See also, Shaffer, supra note 1, at 993 
(arguing that integrated courts are a more efficient service delivery model). 
 83. Id. at 1126-27. 
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access to justice for victims as well as to increase administrative efficiency, 
these practices have helped reduce domestic violence claims “to quasi-legal 
experiences which reinforce the legal system’s propensity to prevent them 
from being presented as formal legal claims at all.”84 
In the context of integrated domestic violence courts, the over-
routinization of domestic violence cases may result in victims being 
directed to court services based on what court personnel believe is 
appropriate, rather than what the victim came for or would select through 
an informed choice.85  Epstein warns that “a woman who enters a 
comprehensive Intake Center seeking only a civil protection order is likely 
to also be automatically routed to a prosecution advocate to initiate 
criminal charges without being asked whether she wishes to do so.”86  
Thus, she observes, even if victims receive more information, the ability of 
victims to decline services may be reduced.87 
For victims with children, the level of choice that would normally be 
available to them in civil systems is further reduced in an integrated court 
by their increased exposure to charges of failing to protect their children 
from the perpetrator’s abuse.88  Exposure to child protection agencies 
curtails victims’ choices in complex ways.  The threat of failure-to-protect 
charges means that victims cannot freely choose whether to go forward 
with a civil order of protection after expiration of the temporary protective 
order.  Victims may also (reasonably) believe it necessary to accept 
unwanted “voluntary” services in order to appease social workers.89  Even 
worse, victims are discouraged from accessing the courts at all when courts 
 
 84. Id. at 1129.  For a summary of the broader critique of efficiency-driven justice (aka, 
rationalized or technocratic justice) see Rekha Mirchandani, What's So Special about 
Specialized Courts? The State and Social Change in Salt Lake City's Domestic Violence 
Court, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 379, 383-86 (June 2005). 
 85. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 38 (describing how a victim may be directed toward 
unwanted services in an integrated court setting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  See also Rebecca Fialk & Tamara Mitchel, Jurisprudence: Due Process 
Concerns for the Underrepresented Domestic Violence Victim, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 
180-83 (2004) (discussing potential conflicts between victims and non-attorney advocates in 
domestic violence court). 
 88. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 34-35 (acknowledging increased risk of victims being 
reported to child protection agencies when using an integrated domestic violence court); 
Fialk & Mitchel, supra note 87, at 183 (describing risks to victims from exposure to 
mandated child abuse reporters in domestic violence court). 
 89. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 301(a) (West 2008) (authorizing social 
workers to implement a “program of supervision . . . in lieu of filing a petition . . . with the 
juvenile court” (e.g., for removal of the child from the home) if she or he determines a child 
“is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or will probably soon be within that 
jurisdiction” and obtains the consent of the child’s parent or guardian for the supervision 
program). 
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are perceived not as safe havens, but as victim-blaming institutions.90 
The heightened risk of failure-to-protect charges faced by victims in 
integrated courts has been attributed to their exposure to government 
attorneys and others with differing professional and institutional interests 
within the integrated court environment.91  This risk and the associated 
reduction of choice for victims may also be related to another facet of court 
bureaucratization: routine discovery of information about litigants and 
cases by court personnel.  Proponents of integrated courts recommend 
court-initiated discovery of information, such as related cases, as part of the 
general effort to reduce court fragmentation and its attendant difficulties.92  
But proponents fail to acknowledge the impact of such procedures on 
victims inside and outside of integrated courts. 
By further breaking down the latent role of the court that is 
characteristic of the adversarial process, court-initiated discovery 
encourages the bureaucratic, de-legalized attitude toward domestic violence 
cases discussed above.  This attitude—in which court personnel are akin to 
social workers and litigants to clients—erodes the distinctions between 
institutional processes and encourages the kind of interagency relationships 
and information sharing likely to result in increased failure-to-protect 
charges against victims.  Moreover, the legitimization of court-initiated 
discovery by proponents of integrated courts makes it more likely that such 
procedures will spread to other courts and outside the context of petitions 
for protective orders, effectively eliminating the ability of victims to choose 
whether or not to disclose a history of domestic violence.  In this way, the 
practice of court-initiated discovery threatens to extinguish a fundamental 
difference between civil and criminal court processes for victims—the 
availability of autonomy-enhancing choices about litigation strategy. 
IV. COURT PLURALISM AS PROTECTION 
A. The Limits of Choice 
Although civil courts may provide victims of domestic violence with a 
level of choice absent from traditional criminal forums, it would be a 
mistake to idealize the legal culture of civil courts and underestimate the 
balancing function of the criminal courts’ normative role.  In fact, there are 
 
 90. See Weber, supra note 14, at 26-27 (describing the dangers of exposing victims 
who are using civil courts to charges of failure to protect their children from domestic 
violence). 
 91. Epstein, supra note 1, at 34-35. 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 33 (stating that in an integrated court each judge “typically receives 
information about the other pending and resolved suits involving the same family”). 
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a number of ways in which the level of “choice” theoretically available to 
victims in civil, as opposed to criminal, forums may be curtailed. 
First, victims who cannot meet the legal criteria for existing remedies, 
such as protection orders, obviously do not have access to domestic 
violence remedies in civil court.  Victims may be excluded from civil 
remedies for domestic violence because they cannot meet relationship 
criteria for such relief.93  In many jurisdictions, victims are also excluded 
from civil as well as criminal remedies if the violence has not yet risen to 
the level of a physically abusive or criminal act.94  In either case, the 
exclusion from civil remedies for domestic violence has far-reaching 
consequences for other legal matters, such as child custody and access to 
immigration relief.95 
Second, even if a victim has access to civil remedies in theory, he or 
she may not have the opportunity to “choose” civil court as an alternative 
to criminal justice.  Entanglement in the justice system is often not a 
choice.  Instead, victims may turn to the police and other public resources 
for assistance due to the absence of other viable alternatives.96  Someone 
other than the victim may also initiate these entanglements.  For example, 
data indicates that emergency police calls often originate from individuals 
other than the victim, such as other household members.97  The perpetrator 
may also instigate a civil or criminal case involving the victim, including as 
a means of furthering the abuse.98 
Third, choices about engaging the civil system are limited by litigants’ 
lack of access to legal representation.99  Lack of representation limits the 
 
 93. See, e.g., Warne, supra note 8, at 281 (describing then-existing New York law 
requiring parties to a civil protective order to have a legally recognized marriage or child in 
common).  See also Klein & Orloff, supra note 41, at 814-842 (describing qualifying 
relationships of various states). 
 94. See Weissman, supra note 69, at 1138 (explaining that the majority of states limit 
civil remedies for domestic abuse to those cases where there is a threat of physical 
violence). 
 95. See id. at 1152-53 (describing the relationship of civil protective orders to relief 
under other civil laws affecting family, immigration and welfare status). 
 96. See, e.g., Wittner, supra note 31, at 87 (observing that women using the domestic 
violence court lacked alternatives). 
 97. See, e.g., Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the 
Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 308 n.35 (1993) (reporting that 
in 1988, thirty-one percent of 911 calls to the San Diego City Attorney’s Domestic Violence 
Unit were placed by children in the household where the violence was occurring). 
 98. See, e.g., BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 113-15 (reporting that 
batterers are more likely to seek custody of their children than non-battering parents and 
describing their motivations for doing so, including the desire to impose control in the 
relationship, retaliate against their former partners, and vindicate themselves). 
 99. See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: 
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 567, 593-94 (2003) (discussing the prohibitive cost of legal 
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substantive value of legal options as a practical matter.100  The high number 
of unrepresented parties in civil forums adjudicating family matters, 
including domestic violence, may also exacerbate the problem of judicial 
interventionism observed in these cases, effectively eroding the distinctions 
between civil and criminal processes.101  Moreover, overcrowded calendars 
in under-resourced courts place severe restrictions on parties’ ability to be 
heard, whether represented or not.102  In addition, as detailed by proponents 
of court integration, there may be access-to-justice problems created by a 
disjointed, ill-planned civil system.103 
Finally, the culture of family courts may inhibit victims’ choices to the 
extent they perceive that revealing the violence may hurt their case, 
especially with regard to child custody.  Such a perception could be 
warranted: extensive literature documents the continued failure of civil 
courts to adequately protect parents and children who are victims of 
domestic violence, including failure to make appropriate orders for 
financial support,104 child custody,105 and child visitation.106  Efforts to 
address the problem by curtailing judicial discretion through statutory 
reform have had limited effect.107  Empirical evidence suggests that bench 
 
representation in family law cases); Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing 
Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL'Y & L. 499, 511 (2003) (reporting that only 36 of 142 women surveyed had legal 
representation in their civil protection order court hearings). 
 100. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 99, at 511-12 (reporting that women seeking domestic 
violence restraining orders were successful eighty-three percent of the time when they were 
represented by an attorney, compared with thirty-two percent without an attorney). 
 101. See Weissman, supra note 69, at 1149 (describing judges in civil protection order 
cases as “more interventionist” than in other kinds of civil litigation). 
 102. See Freedman, supra note 99, at 601 (discussing the impacts of under-resourced 
family courts on cases involving domestic violence). 
 103. See supra Part III. 
 104. See, e.g., JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF 
JUDICIAL RESPONSES 128-33 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1999) (reporting that judges in 
Massachusetts courts discouraged or ignored women’s requests for temporary child support 
orders in connection with restraining order applications, although the judges were 
authorized to make such orders). 
 105. See, e.g., BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 113 (reporting that 
perpetrators of domestic violence are as likely to prevail in their efforts to obtain custody of 
their children as non-perpetrators). 
 106. See, e.g., Kernic et al., supra note 66, at 1014-15 (reporting that only 16.8% of 
fathers in cases surveyed where the court was aware of substantiated domestic violence 
were denied child visitation; supervised visitation “was no more likely” to be ordered for the 
abusive parent in cases involving domestic violence than in other cases). 
 107. See, e.g., Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the 
Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 
1101 (2005), available at http://vaw.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/11/8/1076 (reporting 
that in states with a statutory presumption against awarding custody to batterers, forty 
percent of fathers adjudicated as having committed domestic violence against the mother 
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officers frequently disregard statutory presumptions that batterers are unfit 
for physical custody,108 and often moot the purpose of such 
presumptions─even when custody to batterers is denied─by granting them 
visitation without safety restrictions.109 
The problems faced by victims of domestic violence in family courts 
have been associated with a shift away from traditional adversarial 
processes toward a growing reliance on informal dispute resolution and 
non-legal decision makers.110  This trend is widely viewed as problematic 
for victims of domestic violence.111  To the extent that informal processes 
are mandatory and/or part of a court culture favoring informal resolution of 
claims, they also impinge on the autonomy-enhancing aspects of the civil 
system for victims.112  Yet the growing reliance of courts on child custody 
 
were still awarded joint custody; where there were competing statutory provisions regarding 
custody (e.g., a presumption in favor of joint custody and favoring the parent perceived by 
the court as more open to shared parenting) sole custody was awarded to battering fathers 
more often than to the mothers who were their victims). 
 108. See id. at 1093, 1102 (reporting that mothers actually received sole physical custody 
less frequently (sixty-four percent of the time) when the father was an adjudicated batterer 
in states with such statutory presumptions than in states with no statutory presumption 
(sixty-seven percent); if there were competing presumptions, mothers generally received 
“primary” physical custody, which is tantamount to shared custody (eighty-two percent)). 
 109. See id. at 1102 (reporting that although bench officers in states with a presumption 
against awarding custody to adjudicated batterers imposed conditions on visitation more 
often than in states without such a presumption, “at best, only sixty-four percent of orders in 
these states imposed structure or conditions on visitation orders”). 
 110. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 731-33 (1988) 
(describing mediators and social workers as supplanting legal actors in the family courts and 
recasting divorce and child custody as emotional rather than legal issues); Jane C. Murphy, 
Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 900-02 (2010) 
(describing the “new paradigm for family law decisionmaking”). 
 111. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 66, at 1046-48 (reporting evidence of mediator 
bias in domestic violence cases, including that mediators recommended joint child custody 
arrangements more often in cases involving allegations of domestic violence than in cases 
that did not involve such allegations; supervised child visitation was recommended in a 
higher percentage of cases where there were no indicators of domestic violence than in cases 
where there was substantiated abuse; the lowest rate of recommendations for supervised 
visitation occurred in cases with victim-acknowledged domestic violence that was not 
reported to the court by the mediator).  See also Jane C. Murphy, The Changing Paradigm in 
Family Law: From the Adversary System to the Therapeutic State 26-27 (Mar. 28, 2009) 
(University of Baltimore Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2009-18), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376782 (observing that many courts “are still ordering couples 
who have experienced domestic violence to mediate their family law disputes with little or 
no particularized examination of the couples' circumstances” despite a consensus “that cases 
involving family violence need special treatment in mediation, reflected in both standards 
for mediators and mediation statutes and rules”).  The risks associated with lack of 
adversarial process may be greatest for the poor.  Murphy, supra note 110, at 910-11. 
 112. Any system that advantages settlement presents barriers to due process for a 
minority viewpoint because that viewpoint bears the most litigation risk.  See Robert H. 
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evaluations by mental health professionals in domestic violence cases113 
and recent calls to facilitate rather than discourage mediation and other 
informal dispute resolution processes in these cases114 suggest that the 
trend is toward additional delegalization in family court responses to 
domestic violence, not less. 
In sum, although civil forums have the potential to offer victims 
important alternatives to criminal justice that may enhance their safety and 
autonomy, they cannot be counted on by victims to hold perpetrators of 
domestic violence accountable for abuse or to reliably produce orders that 
help keep their families safe.  Thus, while those attributes of the civil 
system that are valuable to victims should be expanded and protected, the 
importance of maintaining the criminal court functions identified in Part II 
is underscored. 
B. Criminal Court as Counterpoint 
Even a more fully realized civil system would mean little to victims 
without an effective criminal system to back it up.  After all, the option of 
filing a criminal complaint instead of proceeding in civil court, and the 
possibility of exacting criminal penalties for violation of a civil protective 
order, are what give weight to the “choice” of civil action.  But court 
integration may undermine key criminal court functions, thus further 
eroding the important autonomy-enhancing functions of civil courts. 
The functionality of criminal justice for victims is threatened by 
 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 978-80 (1979) (observing that parties bargain in light of a predicted 
legal outcome; if the outcome is uncertain, the party with less power in the relationship 
and/or the most risk adverse suffers most).  The rights talk of victims represents a minority 
viewpoint in a system favoring informality. 
 113. See Meier, supra note 13, at 707-08 (discussing courts’ over-reliance on custody 
evaluators and other purportedly neutral experts in cases involving domestic violence); 
CLARE DALTON ET AL., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, 
NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A 
JUDGES GUIDE 11 (2006), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/BenchGuide.pdf (urging 
that a custody evaluation is almost always warranted if there is “[a] history of physical 
violence in the parents’ relationship”). 
 114. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of 
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(arguing that policies restricting courts’ ability to order parties to mediation in cases 
involving domestic violence fail to recognize the agency of battered women and should be 
abandoned); Desmond Ellis, Divorce and the Family Court: What Can be Done About 
Domestic Violence, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 531, 531-32 (2008) (arguing that the availability of 
mediation should be expanded in family law cases involving domestic violence due to the 
negative emotions reported by participants in adversarial proceedings in family courts); 
Kohn; supra note 72, at 580 (advocating a restorative justice “track” for domestic violence 
cases within the civil court system). 
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integrated courts in several respects.  The long history of judicial resistance 
to domestic violence claims in both civil and criminal courts makes it easy 
to predict that relaxation of the legal formalism and accountability 
associated with criminal court processes would eventually follow court 
integration.  As discussed above, an enforcement-oriented approach to 
domestic violence in criminal justice is still new, and is under fire by critics 
calling for the reform of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing protocols in 
domestic violence cases.  Reformers, while often motivated by the desire to 
empower victims, neglect the distinct roles of the criminal and civil court 
systems.  Their calls for reform may also weaken the resolve of members 
of a besieged system to maintain functions that benefit victims.  Moreover, 
while informalism in the civil system threatens the utility of that system for 
victims, routine practices implemented in many criminal courts with regard 
to domestic violence have created due process burdens for defendants that 
may ease the slide into informalism that integration with the civil system 
portends.115 
i. Procedural Justice and the Benefits-Burdens Paradox 
If domestic violence was a male prerogative within the family under 
the “rule of thumb” and subsequent criminal justice paradigms,116 its 
treatment under modern-day criminal law is more difficult to characterize 
as either a benefit or as a burden imposed on certain relationships.117  This 
is not only because of differing treatment from one jurisdiction to another, 
but also because of the perhaps counter-intuitive significance of those 
distinctions for defendants and victims alike.  Post-adjudication diversion 
programs are a case in point.  In jurisdictions where a domestic violence 
charge is eligible for diversion, the program typically requires the 
defendant to plead guilty, subject to dismissal if he or she successfully 
completes a mandatory treatment program.118  Diversion thus offers 
 
 115. See, e.g., Meekins, supra note 18, at 37-50 (describing the deleterious impact of 
specialty courts, including specialty domestic violence courts, on the ability of defense 
attorneys to protect the rights of criminal defendants); Mirchandani, supra note 84, at 399-
400 (2005) (describing the negative impact on due process norms of domestic violence court 
procedures). 
 116. See infra Part II, and citations therein. 
 117. See DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE & THE 
CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009).  Of course, a family ties analysis of modern domestic 
violence law is also complicated by the fact that applicability of domestic violence laws is 
no longer strictly associated with family status in most jurisdictions.  See id at 152. 
 118. See, e.g., Meekins, supra note 18, at 31-33 (describing the deferred sentencing 
program of Washington D.C.’s domestic violence unit).  Defendants with no significant 
criminal history and who are not alleged to have caused substantial injury to the victim are 
eligible to participate in the program.  Id. at 33.  Treatment in the Washington D.C. program 
includes domestic violence counseling.  Id. 
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significant benefits for a defendant, who may avoid a criminal record and 
thereby also avoid any enhanced penalties if there is a subsequent domestic 
violence offense.119  However, diversion also presents the defendant with 
significant due process burdens. 
A criminal defendant makes the decision whether or not to enter 
diversion—a decision waiving important constitutional rights, including the 
right to a jury trial and to remain silent—early on in the case, before his or 
her attorney can ascertain the facts of the case and without full knowledge 
of the results of failing to successfully complete the program.120  The 
defendant may also be under coercive pressure to accept diversion, facing, 
for example, the dilemma of choosing between immediate release from jail 
or pleading guilty and entering treatment.121  Moreover, diversion is 
typically offered in the context of other court practices that thwart effective 
assistance of counsel in making this and other crucial decisions related to 
the case.122  In this light, diversion can hardly be considered a benefit to 
criminal defendants charged with domestic violence. 
Of course, coercion may be present in other plea bargaining scenarios 
and in other types of cases as well.123  But these practices may be 
 
 119. See, MARKEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 152 (using diversion programs as an 
example of policies that treat domestic violence as a family ties benefit). 
 120. Meekins, supra note 18, at 39-40. 
 121. Id. at 16 n.69 (further noting that similar dilemmas arise if the defendant faces 
sanctions for alleged failures in treatment).  Meekins compares this practice to traditional 
plea bargaining: “While jurisdictional differences exist in plea bargaining practices, in 
almost all situations when a defendant elects to waive his or her rights . . . he or she knows 
what sentence will be handed down, or knows the range that the sentence might entail.  This 
range results in a bargained for outcome, which is usually lower than the time that the 
defendant faces if she elects to proceed to trial.”  Id. at 39 n.177. 
 122. Id. at 16-22.  Meekins describes five characteristics of specialty courts that alter the 
justice system in ways that impede effective assistance of counsel: imposition of mandatory 
treatment early on in the life of the case; acceptance of increasingly punitive sanctions as a 
condition of participation in treatment programs; utilization of a team approach that 
incorporates treatment and other professionals outside the purview of the court and defense 
counsel; an enhanced role for judges that includes increased interaction directly with the 
defendant, wherein defense attorneys are expected not to intervene; and explicit disavowal 
of adversarialism, including by defense counsel.  Id.  The first characteristic is subject to 
variation in specialty domestic violence courts, which (outside the context of diversion) 
typically treat batterer’s treatment as a punishment, requiring it as a condition of probation 
or sentence after trial.  See id. at 24; infra Part II.  Domestic violence courts may also 
impose additional due process burdens on the defendant by requiring him or her to go 
forward without representation in civil matters related to the alleged abuse that are heard in 
the specialized criminal court.  Id.; see also Mirchandani, supra note 84, at 399-400 
(describing non-adversarial court procedures utilized by specialized domestic violence court 
officials despite their negative impact on due process norms). 
 123. See Guzik, supra note 32,  at 127 (citing research showing that the majority of 
defense attorneys are cooperative and “willing to cooperate with the state’s attorney’s office 
by moving their defendants to plea bargain.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and 
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particularly significant in the domestic violence context.  Recent studies 
show that plea bargains are used in misdemeanor domestic violence cases 
to gain additional control over defendants and to secure harsher sentences 
than can be obtained via trial.124  Unsurprisingly, research also shows that 
defendants in domestic violence cases who are subject to such practices 
blame an unfair system for their punishments rather than their own 
behavior, and come “to see themselves as victims of the law.”125  The result 
is to undermine criminal justice functions with respect to domestic violence 
in several ways that run counter to general principles. 
As Markel et al., observe in their explication of burdens in the 
criminal law based on family ties, such burdens generally do not implicate 
normative concerns about incentivizing more crime or inaccurate 
identification of wrongdoers—concerns that are relevant to the analysis of 
criminal law benefits based on status.126  This makes sense: in the case of 
burdens, we are not talking about exceptions to criminal liability based on 
status, but about the creation or enhancement of criminal liability where 
none would exist absent a particular relationship.  Therefore, while 
normative concerns about inequality and gender bias might apply, letting 
wrongdoers get away and encouraging crime is not at issue.127  But these 
generalizations do not apply with regard to burdens imposed in domestic 
violence cases as a result of due process failures. 
ii. Process Defects in Criminal Courts 
The consequences of a lack of due process for domestic violence 
offenders are multifold.  First, such practices may increase crime by adding 
gravitas to defendants’ perceptions of unfair treatment.  Research shows 
that domestic violence defendants who feel they were treated unfairly in the 
criminal justice system are more likely to reoffend.128  One study of 
domestic violence arrestees showed that perceptions of fairness were more 
 
Procedural Justice, 24 GA. L. REV. 407, 415-17 (describing the truncated “bargaining” 
typical of misdemeanor cases generally). 
 124. See Mirchandani, supra note 84, at 397, 409 (reporting that efficiencies obtained 
through standardized plea bargaining allow domestic violence court personnel to subject 
defendants to multiple court appearances); Guzik, supra note 32, at 122 (reporting that 
prosecutors rely on plea bargains to obtain convictions with harsher sentences than are 
available by trial).  Plea bargaining practices where serious felonies are charged may present 
different issues.  See O’Hear, supra note 123, at 415 (noting distinctions are drawn by 
researchers between plea bargaining practices involving misdemeanor and low-level 
felonies, and more serious felonies). 
 125. Guzik, supra note 32, at 129-30. 
 126. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 82. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural 
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 186 (1997). 
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predictive of re-offense than severity of outcome (e.g., arrest vs. release 
after a brief detention).129  The recidivism rates for defendants who 
perceived that they had been treated fairly by police were lower at 
statistically significant rates in either case.130  The significance defendants 
attach to fair treatment within the justice system suggests that the due 
process deprivations that transform seeming benefits like diversion into 
burdens may also increase the likelihood of recidivism. 
High rates of plea bargains in domestic violence cases may also 
facilitate crime by undermining the victim’s confidence in the system.  To 
the complaining victim, plea bargains of all types can look like the 
defendant is getting off easy, with reduced charges, a reduced sentence, and 
reduced accountability.131  Like the defendant who feels coerced, the 
frustrated victim reflects and embodies the erosion of public perceptions of 
and belief in the criminal justice system, regardless of whether she is 
exposed to additional abuse as a result of system failures.  If, as a result, 
victims are less likely to report future crimes against themselves or others, 
or cooperate with the system, these policies may indirectly increase crime 
in this way as well. 
A second challenge to the criminal justice system’s normative 
framework created by due process failures is an increased potential for 
inaccuracy.  If the focus of the court is on obtaining plea agreements rather 
than correctly identifying perpetrators and holding them accountable, then 
the possibility of inaccuracy in the form of false convictions is increased.  
Given the number of domestic violence arrestees who claim to be the real 
victim, this should be a concern for victim advocates as well as 
defendants.132 
More generally, the undue curtailment of adversarial practice in some 
jurisdictions has profound implications for system functionality.  
Commentators note that, in the absence of normal adversarial processes, 
prosecutors can over-populate the system with cases of dubious merit that 
would ordinarily not be charged.133  In the context of other specialty courts, 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Although legal scholars tend to focus on victims who do not want the state to 
proceed in prosecuting domestic violence, in my experience victims are also often frustrated 
with the opposite problem: prosecutorial decisions to offer plea bargains rather than 
proceeding to trial, which are interpreted by victims as not taking the crime seriously and 
giving the defendant a “break.” 
 132. Women are increasingly the arrestees in domestic violence cases. Donna Coker, 
Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 831 (2001) (discussing studies and implications of increased arrest 
rates for women). 
 133. Mae Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender about 
Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 58-59 (2000-2001); 
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the ramifications of such practices have been far reaching: police have 
increased arrest rates, making arrests in cases where they would previously 
not have occurred;134 court dockets have been overwhelmed;135 and 
defender offices have been “inundated by an increase in the number of 
cases, particularly those with little or no merit.”136  Moreover, each of these 
developments has had a disproportionate impact on poor and working class 
communities of color.137  Thus, regardless of whether a greater criminal 
law burden is appropriate for domestic violence crimes,138 the burdens 
imposed on domestic violence defendants by virtue of a lack of procedural 
due process have consequences that undermine the functionality of criminal 
justice in these cases—implicating not only the efficacy of the criminal 
system, but the benefits of court plurality for victims. 
It is important to note that most proponents of specialized domestic 
violence courts affirm the role of criminal courts in ensuring the 
accountability of domestic violence perpetrators to the legal system.139  
Indeed, criminal courts specializing in domestic violence are typically 
distinguished in the literature from other specialty courts by their retention 
of an emphasis on adversarial process and defendant accountability, as well 
as by concerns unique to the domestic violence context such as enhancing 
victim safety.140  Some specialty domestic violence courts may be 
functioning in a manner consistent with these ideals.141  Moreover, given 
 
Morris Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1502-03 (2000) (noting a 
significant increase in the number of drug case filings after the Denver Drug Court was 
established). 
 134. Hoffman, supra note 133, at 1502-03. 
 135. Id. at 1504-05. 
 136. Meekins, supra note 18, at 44. 
 137. Id. at 49 (citing statistics and discussing reasons why members of these groups are 
disproportionately represented in specialty criminal courts).  See generally MACLEOD ET AL., 
supra note 38, at v (finding overrepresentation of poor, uneducated Hispanic men among 
offenders sentenced to batterer intervention programs in California). 
 138. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 152-53 (discussing the absence of a theory 
for treating domestic violence more harshly than other forms of interpersonal violence). 
 139. See, e.g., Judicial Paradigms, supra note 1, at 149 (observing that “punishment, 
deterrence, and traditional criminal objectives must remain a high priority” in a domestic 
violence court); Weber, supra note 14, at 26-27 (listing batterer accountability as among the 
guiding principles of domestic violence intervention); Emily Sack, FAMILY VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION FUND, CREATING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST 
PRACTICES 5-6 (May 2002), available at 
http://www.endabuse.org/userfiles/file/Judicial/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf (identifying 
defendant accountability as a core value and principle of domestic violence courts). 
 140. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 14, at 24-25 (distinguishing domestic violence courts 
from other specialty courts, such as drug courts, that generally deal with non-violence 
offences); Shelton, supra note 11, at 9-11 (comparing differences between other specialized 
courts, such as drug courts, and domestic violence courts). 
 141. See Judicial Paradigms, supra note 1, at 148 (reporting a move away from routine 
plea bargaining procedures, which resulted in more trials: the domestic violence court in 
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the proliferation of specialty courts, even outspoken critics have identified 
modifications that would allow those courts to better comport with due 
process principles.142  Thus, a more robust adversarial process in specialty 
courts is theoretically possible. 
Similarly, there is nothing endemic to the process of plea bargaining, 
for example, that makes it incompatible with tenets of procedural justice.143  
In fact, commentators have emphasized the relative ease with which 
existing practices, including those related to plea bargaining, can be 
modified to comport with defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice.144 
None of this, however, should relax concerns about integrated courts.  
Instead, the persistence of these process problems in criminal courts 
suggests the ease with which criminal justice functions are susceptible to 
further weakening through integration with the civil system.  But even if 
criminal processes remain unaltered in favor of the further transformation 
of civil processes through court integration, victims still lose.  This is 
because both systems offer advantages as well as drawbacks to victims 
seeking help.  Maintaining separate civil and criminal systems preserves 
the advantages and helps contain the potential pitfalls for victims 
navigating violent relationships.  Combining them risks it all, with 
unknown consequences over time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are significant concerns having to do with fragmentation in 
court systems that creates barriers to justice for victims of domestic 
 
Vancouver, Washington tried approximately forty-one percent of all criminal jury trials held 
in the county in 1999). 
 142. Meekins, supra note 18, at 50-55 (detailing reforms that will facilitate more 
effective representation of defendants in specialty courts). 
 143. See O’Hear, supra note 123, at  426-31 (describing ways to incorporate procedural 
justice principles into plea bargaining). 
 144. Id.  Notably, however, suggestions for reform of criminal justice policies, as 
opposed to practices, in order to increase perceptions of procedural justice appear 
misguided.  For example, Epstein recommends (albeit tentatively) a shift away from 
mandatory to presumptive arrest and prosecution policies in order to facilitate defendants’ 
perceptions of procedural justice.  Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the 
State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1887-89 (2002).  
But subsequent research has found that batterers feel unfairly treated under presumptive 
arrest and prosecution policies, “frequently [echoing] the statements that police officers, jail 
guards and defense attorneys used to render them compliant with policing and court setting 
power.”  Guzik, supra note 32, at 131.  Guzik’s findings suggest that these statements tend 
to minimize the appearance of the speaker’s discretion in ways that directly correspond to 
the batterer’s sense of unfair treatment.  Id. at 132 (describing a defendant recounting the 
arresting police officer’s claim that “someone has to go to jail on a domestic battery call”).   
Thus, arrest and prosecution policies alone are not determinative of perceptions of 
procedural justice; the manner of their implementation must be addressed. 
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violence.  However, such problems can and should be addressed in ways 
that preserve court plurality, which itself may provide victims of domestic 
violence some protection from system flaws, while supporting autonomy 
and safety.  Reformers should therefore also work to identify and improve 
the distinct components of civil and criminal courts that support the efforts 
of victims to seek help and resist violence.  In the case of civil courts, this 
means strengthening those institutional practices, structures and functions 
that allow victims to pursue with self-direction remedies addressing their 
unique circumstances and needs.  With regard to the criminal courts, 
reform efforts should be guided by the broader pubic commitments of the 
criminal justice system, which demand individual accountability to social 
norms rather than individual desires.  In this context, the test for reform 
should be the likelihood that a proposal will strengthen the core functions 
of the court while maintaining the benefits of court pluralism. 
As this test suggests, taking court plurality into account will require 
consideration of more than the ideal functions of one or both systems.  
Instead, it is imperative that policy analysts consider the ways in which 
system functions are impacted by current court culture and practice.  A 
better understanding of the nature of court pluralism and court functions in 
a pluralistic court system may alter the analysis of problems and proposals 
for reform in significant ways.  What has been referred to as court 
pluralism in this Article—the notion that the differences between civil and 
criminal courts with regard to features and functions are important—points 
to the need for further inquiry.  Moreover, the ways in which civil and 
criminal courts fall short of their ideal functions in domestic violence cases 
suggests some priorities for future research. 
Chief among these priorities is an examination of the relationship 
between a robust adversarial process and the functions of civil and criminal 
courts.  The impact of process failures in civil and criminal courts on 
domestic violence cases suggests that erosion of adversarial systems 
negatively impacts court functions, yet many proposed reforms involve 
moving away from formal adjudicatory processes.  Inquiry is needed into 
how consideration of court functions—and function failures—in a 
pluralistic system changes the analysis of such reforms. 
Further inquiry is also needed into the appropriate relationship of civil 
and criminal remedies to one another and the respective goals of these 
systems.  For example, if it is in keeping with the function of civil justice 
for civil domestic violence remedies to be more expansive than many 
jurisdictions currently provide—allowing for remedy of a broader array of 
harms than can or should be addressed through criminal law—is a 
corresponding adjustment to criminal law penalties indicated on the other 
side of the equation?  This question has dimensions independent of reform 
in the civil arena (e.g., are criminal penalties and practices properly crafted 
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to address the social harm of domestic violence?), and dimensions that 
work in tandem with civil reforms (e.g., through the criminal enforcement 
of civil restraining orders).  Consideration of court plurality would 
strengthen inquiries into all aspects of the calibration of civil and criminal 
remedies by affording a more complete analysis of the problem. 
In addition, analysis of integrated courts begs the more general 
question: what is the appropriate role of specialized domestic violence 
courts in a pluralistic court system?  How and to what extent are 
specialized domestic violence courts compatible with the functions of 
either civil or criminal justice with regard to this particular social problem?  
In addressing these questions, empirical research methods might be 
employed to study impacts of specialty courts on court function.  The 
normative concerns raised here are obviously not amenable to study by 
quantitative measures alone.  However, qualitative research methods such 
as interviews and court observation could be employed to discern impacts 
of specialty domestic violence courts on court functions, with particular 
reference to the experiences of victims and perpetrators. 
Finally, the complex relationship between autonomy and court 
functions demonstrated above suggests a closer analysis of autonomy will 
be essential to this research agenda.  Accounts of autonomy in legal 
scholarship that focus on the provision of choice are revealed as 
dangerously incomplete when viewed in light of court pluralism.  In 
contrast, recent scholarship from the social sciences drawing on relational 
views of autonomy and emerging theories of the state as fractured and 
dynamic rather than monolithic and static suggests promising new 
directions for analyzing the relationship between individuals and the justice 
system.145  An interdisciplinary approach might therefore benefit efforts by 
legal scholars to build a more accurate and useful account of autonomy in 
the context of court pluralism.  In all instances, the study of court-based 
responses, and the utility of proposed reforms to victims of domestic 
violence, will benefit from a systems view that takes court plurality into 
account. 
 
 
 145. See Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, The Autonomy-Fostering State: “Coordinated 
Fragmentation” and Domestic Violence Services, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 307 (2009). 
